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WHOSE LINE IS IT ANYWAY?: McDONALD V. McDONALD AND
THE SUBSTANTIVE USE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM'S




Jodi Picoult's 2004 novel My Sister's Keeper details thirteen-year-old Anna
Fitzgerald's quest to be medically emancipated from her parents.' Anna's
parents conceived her p imarily to serve as a bone marrow and organ donor for
their older daughter, Kate, who was suffering from leukemia.2 Anna sought
emancipation after her parents requested she donate a kidney to save her sister's
life.3 Because her parents had obvious conflicts of interest, the judge appointed
a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent Anna's interests throughout the
proceedings.4 During the story, Picoult characterized the GAL as being one of
the most important players in chancery court proceedings:
A guardian ad litem . . . is appointed by a court to be a child's
advocate during legal proceedings that involve a minor ...
[Someone with] a moral compass and a heart. Which, actually
probably renders most lawyers unqualified for the job. 5
As fiction reflects reality, the extent of the GAL's involvement in child
abuse and neglect cases undoubtedly renders the responsibility emotionally
difficult. That emotional difficulty and the sensitive nature of chancery court
proceedings require relaxed evidentiary standards governing GAL reports.
Chancery courts should allow hearsay testimony in that context to reach the best-
interests analysis more quickly and to better allow the GAL to perform his or her
intended function more efficiently.
In 2010, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that hearsay testimony in a
GAL's report was not admissible as substantive evidence in chancery court when
it decided McDonald v. McDonald.6  The rule, announced without
* J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Mississippi College School of Law. A special thank you to Professor
Loren H. Pratt, without whose assistance this article would have been impossible. Her patience and creativity
were an invaluable asset, and I cannot convey enough gratitude for her countless edits, revisions, and
comments. And I'd like to offer special thanks to my parents, Greg and Laura Rucker, and my brother, Wesley
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1. JODI PICOULT, MY SISTER'S KEEPER 694 (2004).
2. Id. at 7-8.
3. Id. at 31.
4. Id. at 188-90.
5. Id. at 188-89.
6. McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So. 3d 868, 884 (Miss. 2010).
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accompanying analysis or reasoning,] has the potential to foster several
unfavorable consequences.8 Now, the chancellor's ability to decide cases based
on a comprehensive evidentiary record is effectively crippled because he or she
is forced to issue rulings without hearing the evidence in its entirety. Further,
prohibiting a GAL from testifying or submitting a report as to the full extent of
his or her investigation could leave the GAL "feeling like the entire investigative
and reporting process is a futile endeavor," which could compromise her ability
to fairly represent he interests of her wards.9 And disallowing critical testimony
could leave the GAL unable to provide a chancellor with enough information to
make emergency decisions, which are often required in chancery court.10 The
emergency nature of these situations would necessarily render the compilation of
additional evidence too burdensome.
As explained in this Note, hearsay testimony from a GAL's oral or written
report should be substantively admissible in chancery court. Part II of this Note
discusses the facts and procedural history of the McDonald case. Part III
discusses the background of the law in Mississippi, which the majority used to
reach its decision and the concurring Justices used to reach their independent
conclusions. Part IV addresses the Instant Case, including the majority's
holdings and the reasoning contained within the concurring opinions. Part V
provides analyses of the issue, including a discussion of the difference between
youth and chancery court and why the difference is immaterial;"I the role of the
chancellor as an impartial factfinder; and several public policy reasons why
hearsay testimony is appropriate in GAL reports presented in chancery court.
And Part VI contains a reform proposal, including text for potential legislation,
designed specifically to address concerns previously articulated by Mississippi
lawmakers.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prior to their divorce in 2003, Steven and Jennifer McDonald had two sons,
Douglas and Blake, born in 2000 and 2001.12 Upon divorce, the parties
executed an agreement that awarded Jennifer custody of the two sons and
outlined Steven's visitation rights and his child-support obligations.13 Steven
7. Id.
8. Since the McDonald case was decided in 2010, the Mississippi Supreme Court has not addressed
the issue in subsequent cases.
9. Michelle Johnson-Weider, Guardians ad Litem: A Solution Without Strength in Helping Protect
Dependent Children, THE FLORIDA BAR JOURNAL, http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal0l.nsf
/cOd731e03de9828d852574580042ae7a/75e435e6cl2f5ef885256cf60079d9b4!OpenDocument&Highlight=0,*
T 4 (writing about how GALs in Florida serve primarily to assist the triers of fact in serving the best interests of
children generally, which requires leniency in evidentiary and procedural standards).
10. McDonald, 39 So. 3d at 889.
11. In his concurrence, Justice Dickinson attempted to negate the authority upon which Justice Pierce
relied by noting that the McDonald case was heard in chancery court, while Pizzino v. Miller, 67 Mass. App.
Ct. 865, 875-76 (2006), was heard in youth court. As explained in Section IV of this Note, the courts are
similar in function and form, so this distinction should not provide a reason for discounting credible and
relevant opposing authority.
12. McDonald, 39 So. 3d at 870.
13. Id. at 871.
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consistently failed to pay child support within the first year, so Jennifer initiated
contempt proceedings in June 2004.14 On the advice of his attorney, Steven
began making consistent monthly payments, but he never paid arrearage, which
Jennifer claimed exceeded $10,000.15
In March 2006 (while the contempt proceedings were pending), Jennifer
moved to modify visitation, alleging that Steven had physically and sexually
abused Douglas by "dragg[ing] him by the hair ... and bit[ing] him on the
penis."'6 But Douglas's doctor reported that the boy exhibited no signs of
abuse, and the court-appointed psychologist opined that the story originated from
an incident involving another child at daycare.17 Jennifer also alleged that
Steven had choked Blake with a bed sheet, leaving a red mark on his neck.18
Steven contended that the abrasion occurred as a result of tucking the child in
bed too tightly, and social workers characterized the event as an "isolated
incident of inappropriate discipline."'9  Steven's visitation rights were
consequently restricted, but full visitation was restored within six months.2 0 In
August 2006, Steven argued that he should be awarded sole custody of the boys
based on "behavioral, developmental, educational, medical, and psychological
problems that Jennifer was not adequately addressing."2 1
Rankin County Chancery Court held hearings on the various motions in
early 2007.22 The chancellor accepted Jennifer's child support calculations and
found Steven to be in contempt, ordering that he pay child support arrearages
within forty-five days.2 3 Finding that the judgment "cleansed the contempt," the
chancellor proceeded to hear testimony regarding the modification motions.24
At the hearing, Steven alleged that Jennifer's overindulgence fostered
behavioral problems in both boys, who had been dismissed from three
daycares.25 Blake had previously been hospitalized for psychiatric treatment and
diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), among other
psychiatric disturbances.26  Douglas suffered from anxiety and was also
diagnosed with ADHD. 27  And both boys exhibited poor academic
performance.28 Blake was "in danger of failing kindergarten," and Douglas was








21. Id. at 871-72.
22. Id. at 871.
23. Id. at 871-72.







MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
comply with the doctor's orders by administering the boys' medications
improperly and occasionally failing to administer them entirely.3 0
The chancellor also heard testimony from several witnesses, including both
parents, a psychologist, a daycare director, two teachers, the GAL, and Steven's
new wife, Danna.3 1  The parties also presented several exhibits, including
discipline and attendance reports.32 The evidence generally demonstrated that
the boys suffered from pronounced behavioral abnormalities and that Jennifer
was non-responsive to the assistive efforts of teachers, doctors, and daycare
personnel.33 When questioned about several of Blake's discipline reports, which
she had initialed, Jennifer denied knowledge of seven, and she admitted that she
had not filled one of Blake's prescriptions in several months.3 4 Finally, Jennifer
blamed the daycare for her sons' misbehavior.3 5
Notably, the GAL "submitted a report, testified, and questioned
witnesses."3 6 During the course of her pre-hearing investigation, the GAL
visited the children in the homes of both parents.37 The visits revealed that
Jennifer's home was not conducive to discipline but that Steve's new marriage
had greatly improved his ability to appropriately parent the boys.3 8 Further, the
GAL assisted the court in weighing the Albright factors,39 often considered in
child custody determinations.40 She ultimately recommended that the court
grant physical custody to Steven because of Jennifer's inability to manage the
boys' medical needs and consequent misbehavior.4 1  The chancellor relied
primarily upon the GAL's description of the differences in the children's
behavior at their mother's home and their behavior at their father's home.42
Concluding that a material change in circumstances had occurred, the chancellor
granted Steven's motion for modification.4 3  Steven was granted primary
custody of the boys, and Jennifer was allowed liberal visitation, including






35. Id. at 873.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 874.
38. Id.
39. The Albright factors are as follows: "health [] and sex of the child; a determination of the parent that
has had the continuity of care prior to the separation; which has the best parenting skills and which has the
willingness and capacity to provide primary child care; the employment of the parent and responsibilities of
that employment; physical and mental health and age of the parents; emotional ties of parent and child; moral
fitness of the parents; the home, school, and community record of the child; the preference of the child at the
age sufficient to express a preference by law; stability of the home environment and employment of each
parent, and other factors relevant to the parent-child relationship." Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005
(Miss. 1983).
40. McDonald, 39 So. 3d at 874.
41. Id. at 873-74.
42. Id. at 875.
43. Id. at 874.
44. Id.
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Before the custody transfer, Steven filed an emergency motion requesting
immediate transfer.4 5 At the hearing on the matter, Douglas's teacher testified
that the child told her he would no longer see his mother if he went to live with
his father because she would be going to Heaven.46 The teacher also testified
that Blake would not be progressing to first grade, and that he had threatened to
kill himself in class.47 After Blake's suicidal comment, the court-appointed
psychologist met with Steve, Danna, the GAL, and the boys' doctor.4 8 Despite
being invited, Jennifer did not attend the meeting.49 The doctors and the GAL
agreed that the immediate transfer was in the best interest of the children, and the
chancellor modified the order accordingly.5 0
In October 2007, Steven again requested that the court modify the custody
arrangement, specifically asking the chancellor to terminate Jennifer's
Wednesday night visits. 5 1 A hearing on the matter was scheduled for January
2008, and the GAL moved for a temporary modification until the motion could
be resolved.52 The GAL noted that the boys had been tardy and disruptive at
school on Thursdays and that Jennifer had misapplied the boys' medicationS.53
At an emergency hearing in November 2007, the GAL presented an oral report,
which included hearsay testimony from both boys and their teachers.54 The
testimony indicated, for example, that one teacher had to modify her class
schedule to accommodate the boys' misbehavior on Thursdays (after they had
spent the night with their mother) and that Douglas reported each Thursday that
"his stepmother was evil" and that "his father beat him." 55 According to the
teachers, the boys were well behaved on other school days.5 6 At the hearing,
Jennifer objected to the GAL's report as "hearsay testimony from a nonexpert
witness."57 The chancellor acknowledged that the information was hearsay but
allowed the testimony regardless, noting that "historical practice"58 allows a
court to accept hearsay from a GAL in the same way hearsay is acceptable from
an expert witness.59
In April 2008, Jennifer filed another motion for contempt in Rankin County
Chancery Court (because Steven had moved his family to Madison County), and
45. Id. at 875.
46. Id.
47. Id.




52. Id. at 876-77.





58. The chancellor did not cite the specific rule or provision upon which he relied to overrule the
objection. He merely stated, "[tihe historical practice is that we allow [a GAL to present hearsay testimony] in
the same way that we allow an expert to regurgitate hearsay. It's patently hearsay but - I'm going to allow it."
McDonald, 39 So. 3d at 878.
59. Id.
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Steven counterclaimed for contempt.60 While the motion was pending, Jennifer
accused Danna of abusing the boys.6 1 Although Danna admitted spanking the
boys, she contended that the recent bruise on Douglas's leg had occurred as a
result of a fall.62 In May 2008, Madison County DHS received custody and then
transferred custody to Jennifer.63  Steven challenged the jurisdiction of the
Madison County Youth Court and subsequently filed a request for relief with
Rankin County Chancery Court.64
The chancellor heard the various motions in August 2008.65 At the hearing,
the GAL presented another oral report.66 Jennifer again objected to the GAL's
testimony, alleging that she "had not rendered a report and was not qualified as
an expert."67 The court permitted the testimony, noting that the GAL had little
time to prepare a written report because Madison County personnel had been
largely uncooperative.68 As to jurisdiction, the chancellor found that the matter
should have been filed in Rankin County originally and that the Madison County
judge had violated due process by modifying custody without holding a shelter
hearing.69
The chancellor ultimately held that the Madison County DHS employees
had acted improperly by removing the boys from Steven's custody, and Jennifer
appealed the chancellor's ruling.70 On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court
considered, among other issues,7 1 whether the chancellor's substantive
admission of the GAL's hearsay testimony was appropriate.7 2
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW IN MISSISSIPPI
In order to frame the discussion concerning the use of testimonial hearsay
from a GAL, a review of the law governing guardians ad litem generally is
appropriate. After discussing the various controlling statutes and pertinent court
authority, this section will examine the Rules of Evidence and other authority
governing the use of hearsay testimony in chancery and other court proceedings.










69. Id. A shelter hearing may be conducted to determine if a child should be removed from the custody
of the person with whom he or she is living and, if so, to make a decision concerning where the child should be
placed. ORS § 419B.180.
70. Id.
71. The Court considered four other issues, as follows: "(I) Whether it was error to proceed with Steve's
modification motion after finding that the contempt judgment was cleansing. (II) Whether it was error to find
that a material change of circumstances had occurred, justifying a change of custody of both boys. (III)
Whether the chancellor improperly weighed and applied the Albright factors. . . . (V) Whether the Chancery
Court of Rankin County properly exercised jurisdiction over the allegations of abuse raised in 2008." Id.
72. Id.
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that the substantive use of hearsay testimony from a GAL is both appropriate and
necessary in chancery court.
A. Mississippi Statutes and Cases Concerning Guardians Ad Litem
"Guardians ad litem are [] appointed in child-custody cases pursuant to
Mississippi Code Sections 43-21-121 and 93-11-65."73 Section 43-21-121
governs the appointment and duties of GALs in youth court proceedings.74
Several circumstances mandate the appointment of a GAL for the protection of
the child, including cases of abuse and neglect, parental indifference, or in
situations in which the court "cannot acquire personal jurisdiction over a
parent."75 The statute explicitly provides that a GAL must act to protect the
interests of the child for whom he or she is appointed and must "investigate
[and] make recommendations to the court or enter reports as necessary to hold
paramount the child's best interests."76 Thus, the GAL is not an adversary party
and is appointed solely to protect the interests of the child in youth court
proceedings.77
Section 93-11-65 governs child custody and support issues in chancery
court proceedings.78 The statute provides that a GAL must be appointed to
protect a child's best interests in cases of abuse and neglect and should be
appointed "as provided under Section 43-21-121 for youth court proceedings."79
And Section 93-5-23 provides for the appointment of a GAL if abuse charges
arise in the divorce context.80 The statute also provides that the chancery court
should consult the youth court rules to determine when and how to appoint a
GAL. 81
The failure to appoint a GAL, as required by statute, is a violation of the
child's due process rights.82 According to In the Interest of R.D., "[w]hether
requested or not, judges have the obligation to appoint a guardian ad litem to
represent every minor alleged to be abused or neglected as the statute
requires."83 There, two minor children were removed from their mother's
custody and placed within the custody of the state.84 Although the mother
attended parenting classes, the social worker refused to continue investigating
the case because she feared for her own safety in the mother's home.85 The
court failed to appoint a GAL to represent the child, which the Mississippi
73. Id. at 888.
74. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-121 (1972).
75. Id. §43-21-121(1).






82. McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So. 3d 868, 883 (Miss. 2010).
83. In the Interest of R.D., 658 So. 2d 1378, 1385 (Miss. 1995).
84. Id. at 1380.
85. Id.
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Supreme Court held constituted reversible error.86 Most importantly, the R.D.
Court adopted three requirements governing the appointment of GALs, including
(1) that the GAL be competent, (2) that he or she have no interests adverse to
those of the child, and (3) that the GAL be properly instructed on the
performance of his or her duties.87
In S.G. v. D.C., the Court articulated three distinct roles that a GAL may
fulfill, subject to the discretion of the chancellor: (1) "an arm of the court"; (2)
an advocate for the child's wishes; or (3) a best-interests attorney.88 Thus, the
GAL is not limited to the traditional attorney-client responsibilities but must also
adequately inform the court concerning the circumstances of a particular case.89
Although the GAL may serve multiple functions, the chancellor should clearly
define the purpose for which the GAL is appointed and should require the GAL
to conform to those responsibilities.90 Notably, the S.G. Court discussed the
function of a GAL when appointed in an investigative capacity.91 When asked
to make a recommendation (which is common practice),92 the GAL should
provide the court with all of the information necessary to make a proper
determination, including any information that would tend to rebut the GAL's
recommendation.93 Fundamentally, "the court must be provided all material
information the guardian ad litem reviewed in order to make the
recommendation."94
But the GAL's investigative and reporting powers are not unlimited; the
chancellor must determine when a GAL has failed to fulfill his or her duties
properly.95 In Interest of D.K.L., the minor child was sexually abused by her
stepfather, who pled guilty to the consequent criminal charges.96 At the family
court hearing, a therapist testified that the stepfather would not likely abuse the
child again and that it would be within the best interests of the child to be
reunited with him.97  The GAL deferred entirely to the therapist's
recommendation and did not offer a recommendation of his own.9 8 On appeal,
the Court held that the GAL did not perform as required and failed to zealously
represent the child's interests because the GAL failed to independently
investigate the matter or provide a recommendation to the Court.99 Notably, the
86. Id. at 1384.
87. Id. at 1383 (citing Shainwald v. Shainwald, 395 S.E.2d 441, 444 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990)).
88. S.G. v. D.C., 13 So. 3d 269, 280 (Miss. 2009).
89. BELL on MISSISSIPPI FAMILY LAW § 5:10, at 136 (2005).
90. S.G., 13 So. 3d at 281.
91. Id. at 282.
92. BELL on MISSISSIPPI FAMILY LAW § 5:10, at 136 (2005).
93. S.G., 13 So. 3d at 283.
94. Id. at 282 (emphasis added).
95. McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So. 3d 868, 883 (Miss. 2010).
96. In the Interest of D.K.L., 652 So. 2d 184, 185 (Miss. 1995).
97. Id. at 186-87.
98. Id. at 188; see also M.J.S.H.S. v. Yalobusha Co. Dep't. of Human Servs., 782 So. 2d 737, 741
(Miss. 2001) (finding that a GAL's failure to visit his wards or interview witnesses constituted reversible
error).
99. D.K.L., 652 So. 2d at 191.
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dissent took issue with the majority's criticism of the therapist's testimony.100
Although the testimony included hearsay from another doctor, the testimony was
corroborated by outside evidence and, thus, bore sufficient guarantees of
reliability. 101
The procedural flexibility unique to chancery court was discussed in depth
in S.N.C. v. J.R.D., which provides that the chancellor is free to adopt or reject
the GAL's recommendation.102 In S.N.C., the parents entered into a separation
agreement whereby they would share physical custody of the child.103 The
agreement did not mention child support obligations.104 Although the mother
relocated to Texas, the father made several visits to see the child and sent the
child several gifts by mail.10 5 Three years after the agreement was executed, the
mother initiated termination of parental rights proceedings against the father, and
the court appointed a GAL to represent the child.106 The GAL conducted an
investigation and recommended at trial that the father's parental rights be
terminated based on his failure to pay child support.10 7 On appeal, the Court
held that the chancellor was within his rights to reject that recommendation, but
the reasons for his departure from the GAL's recommendation should be clearly
articulated in the final decree.108
The broad scope of the GAL's responsibilities in chancery court was further
illustrated in D.J.L. v. Bolivar County Department ofHuman Services.109 There,
the Court held that a GAL may examine witnesses and must be available for
cross-examination.10  There, two minor children were removed from the
custody of their parents under suspicion of abuse.1 11 DHS filed a termination of
parental rights petition, and the Court appointed a GAL to represent the
children.112 At the hearing, the GAL examined witnesses, and the Court
ultimately held that termination was appropriate.113 On appeal, the Court
considered the youth court statutes governing dispositional hearings, which
provide that "[t]he court may consider any evidence which is material and
100. Id. at 193.
101. Id. Although the Mississippi Rules of Evidence do not contain a residual exception, the Court's
language in D.KL. closely resembles Federal Rule of Evidence 807, which provides, inter alia, that hearsay
evidence may be admitted if it contains "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." FED. R. EVID. 807.
102. S.N.C. v. J.R.D., 755 So. 2d 1077, 1082 (Miss. 2000); see also Pogue v. Pogue, 126 So. 3d 967, 971
(Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the chancellor may adopt the GAL's report in its entirety).




107. Id. at 1080.
108. Id. at 1081-82; see also Gunter v. Gray, 876 So. 2d 315, 323 (Miss. 2004) (holding that the
chancellor is not bound to follow the GAL's recommendations but must give reasons for not doing so); In re
L.D.M., 848 So. 2d 181, 182 (Miss. 2003) (holding that youth courts are also required to clearly state the
reasons for not adopting a GAL's recommendations).
109. D.J.L. v. Bolivar Co. Dep't. of Human Servs., 824 So. 2d 617, 623 (Miss. 2002).
110. Id. at 623.
111. Id. at 619.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 620.
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relevant to the disposition of the case, including hearsay and opinion
evidence." 
11 4
And in Lindsey v. Willard, the Mississippi Court of Appeals held that GALs
appointed in an investigative capacity have considerable discretion concerning
how to present their findings to the court, owing in part to their special training
as GALs and in part to their ability to question a broader litany of witnesses than
what may be available to other judicial officers.115 In Lindsey, the minor child's
mother filed a motion to modify the visitation schedule, alleging that the father's
recent divorce and other environmental factors constituted a material change in
circumstances.1 16 On appeal, the father contended that the GAL conducted her
investigation improperly.17 But the court found that the GAL had performed
properly and had made herself available for cross-examination.118 Although the
chancellor agreed with the GAL's recommendation, he did so based on the
GAL's extensive factual findings and his own analysis.119
B. Mississippi Law Governing Hearsay
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801 (governing hearsay generally), patterned
on Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,12 0 provides that hearsay is an out
of court assertion "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."1 2 1 Neither the Federal nor the Mississippi Rule contains an exception
for GALs.122 But Rule 706 permits the appointment of a GAL as an expert
witness.12 3 The text of the rule specifically provides that the court may appoint
an expert witness to testify, who will then report the findings of his or her
investigation and be subject to cross-examination.12 4 Further, Rule 702 provides
that an expert may testify based on "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence."1 2 5 The
Official Comment carefully notes that the Rule "does not abolish the use of
opinions."'2 6 Last, Rules 803 and 804 contain thirty-one exceptions to the rule
against hearsay, none of which address the specialized role of the guardian ad
litem. 127
In Jones v. Jones, the court specifically addressed the admission of hearsay
testimony in GAL reports, holding that the admission should be based on the
requirements articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v.
114. Id. at 621 (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-601 (2000) (emphasis added)).
115. Lindsey v. Willard, 11 So. 3d 1260, 1266 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
116. Id. at 1262-63.
117. Id. at 1263.
118. Id. at 1266.
119. Id. at 1267.
120. Miss. R. EVID. 801; FED. R. EVID. 801.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Miss. R. EVID. 706.
124. Id.
125. Miss. R. EVID. 702.
126. Id.
127. McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So. 3d 868, 887 (Miss. 2010); see also Miss. R. Evid. 803-04.
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Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 128  Although Daubert requires expert
testimony to be both relevant and reliable, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held
that most of the Daubert safeguards are not essential in cases (like chancery
court cases) in which the "judge sits as the trier of fact in place of a jury."' 29
The judge's education and experience should negate the dangers often associated
with evidence that may be prejudicial or otherwise inadmissible.130 In Jones, the
GAL testified as an expert and reported that no abuse had occurred in the
father's home based on hearsay statements provided by the minor child.13 1 But
the court held GAL was not qualified as an expert in child sex abuse and should
have contacted a professional before rendering her opinion.13 2  The court
suggested that the testimonial hearsay at issue would have been admissible if the
GAL had been qualified as an expert in child sex abuse.133
Evidentiary standards, including those governing hearsay testimony, are
generally more relaxed in youth court proceedings because the judge alone acts
as the factfinder.13 4 According to In Interest of T.L.C., the Mississippi Rules of
Evidence do not even apply in youth court.135 And for several reasons, the
lenient evidence rules applied in youth court should be applied in chancery court
also. The nature of youth courts and their relation to chancery courts is
specifically discussed in Interest of D.L.D., which concerned an abused child.136
The Court reasoned that the youth court properly handled the matter because it
was specifically created as a division of chancery court to handle abuse cases.137
Thus, youth court is a "subsidiary" of chancery court, and chancery court judges
preside over youth court proceedings.138 The difference primarily concerns the
original jurisdiction of the two: youth court adjudicates only cases involving
abused and neglected children, while chancery court has a more "full" range of
jurisdiction. 139
128. Jones v. Jones, 43 So. 3d 465, 480 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
129. Id. at 484 (citing Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Martin, 994 So. 2d 740, 746 (Miss. 2008); Gibbs v. Gibbs, 210
F.3d 491, 500 (5th Cir. 2000)).




134. In Interest of T.L.C., 566 So. 2d 691, 700 (Miss. 1990); see also In re D.O., 798 So. 2d 417, 421
(Miss. 2001).
135. T.L.C., 566 So. 2d at 700 (holding that a nurse's personal knowledge of a child's medical history is
sufficient to support opinion testimony because the evidentiary standards in youth court are relaxed).
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 1101 provides several circumstances in which the rules of evidence do not apply,
including "proceeds for extradition or rendition; probable cause hearings in criminal cases and youth court
cases; sentencing; disposition hearings; granting or revoking probation; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal
summonses, and search warrants; and proceedings with respect to release on bail or otherwise." MISS. R. EVID.
1 101(b)(3).
136. In the Interest of D.L.D., 606 So. 2d 1125, 1126 (Miss. 1992).
137. Id. at 1127-28 (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-151(1)-(2)).
138. Id.
139. Id. The Mississippi Constitution provides that chancery court has jurisdiction over the following
matters: "(a) all matters in divorce and equity; (b) divorce and alimony; (c) matters testamentary and of
administration; (d) minor's business; (e) cases of idiocy, lunacy, and persons of unsound mind; (f) all cases of
which the said court had jurisdiction under the laws in force when this Constitution is put in operation." MISS.
CONST. Art. 6, § 159.
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IV. INSTANT CASE
In its opinion, the Court dedicated less analysis to the hearsay in the GAL
report than it did to other errors on appeal.140 But the structure of the opinion
itself demonstrates the importance of the hearsay issue to the entire bench.141
The majority opinion summarily dismissed the problem (perhaps to mask it
entirely), but the activity in the concurring and dissenting opinions is telling.142
Five justices specially concurred to advocate a flat prohibition on the type of
hearsay at issue in McDonald.143 Three justices, however, concurred only in
part, encouraging the Court to adopt a more realistic standard for the use of
hearsay testimony in chancery court proceedings.144
A. Majority Opinion by Justice Randolph
Mississippi Supreme Court Justice Michael Randolph authored the majority
opinion, ultimately ruling that the judgment of the Rankin County Chancery
Court should be affirmed.145 The Court primarily confined its analysis of the
GAL's participation to the role of the GAL generally and devoted little
attention-merely one paragraph-to Jennifer's hearsay objection.146 Instead of
citing authority in support of its own position on the issue, the majority used one
footnote to disparage the authority upon which Justice Pierce relied in his
concurrence.147  Before addressing the hearsay objection at all, the Court
attempted to mask its lack of analysis or supporting citations by engaging in an
extraneous topical discussion of the law governing GALs generally.148
First, the Court discussed S.G. v. D.C. to illustrate the "proper role of a
GAL," but the discussion ultimately refuted the very proposition the Court later
purported to advance.149 The Court quoted directly from the S. G. opinion, in
which that Court sharply criticized the GAL for making a recommendation
without providing the Court with "all material information [weighing] on the
issue to be decided."150 Admittedly, the GAL in the instant case did not offer
the type of scant testimony condemned in S.G. but, rather, "reported on all
matters required by her appointment."151 So the Court considered the GAL's
testimony to be appropriate but condemned the chancellor's admission of the
same testimony five paragraphs later.152
The Court next analyzed In the Interest of D.K.L. and In the Interest of
140. See McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So. 3d 868, 870-87 (Miss. 2010).
141. See id. at 870-90.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 887-88.
144. Id. at 888-90.
145. Id. at 887.
146. Id. at 884.
147. Id. at 884.
148. Id. at 884.
149. Id. at 882-84.
150. Id. at 883.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 883-84.
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R.D., which both support the GAL's ability to disclose the entirety of his or her
investigation.153 D.K.L. provides that a GAL may not defer entirely to the
findings of other experts but must conduct a separate investigation and submit an
independent recommendation. 154 And R.D. provides that the GAL must
zealously represent the interests of his or her wards by "marshal[ling]
evidence."155 Finally, as to the role of the GAL, the Court discussed D.J.L. v.
Bolivar County Department ofHuman Services, which further bolsters the notion
that a GAL should have broad and flexible discretion to present his or her
recommendation to the court.156 D.J.L. provides that a GAL must submit both
written and oral reports upon request and should conduct a comprehensive
investigation in order to make the most appropriate recommendation possible.157
As to the GAL's performance in the instance case, the Court held that the
chancellor had ruled appropriately after considering the evidence in its entirety
and making "independent findings of fact." 158 The chancellor's decision was
based in part on the GAL's report, which contained the contested hearsay.159
But the Court neglected to note that his consideration of the report was
inappropriate until its cursory analysis of the hearsay issue in the subsequent
paragraphs.160 The Court's competing statements on the issue provide little
practical guidance to chancellors and lend themselves to multiple interpretations.
The Court ultimately stated in dicta that the chancellor erred by allowing
the substantive use of testimonial hearsay in the GAL's report.161 Jennifer
objected to the GAL's first report on hearsay grounds, but she later agreed to the
modification order, which mooted the issue on appeal.162 As to the GAL's
second report, Jennifer objected on grounds other than hearsay.163 Finally,
Jennifer argued that evidentiary rules concerning hearsay and expert testimony
require the "repeal of the statute delineating the duties of a GAL."' 64 But the
GAL was appointed without reference to the statute, so the Court noted that her
argument was frivolous. 165  Thus, the chancellor's allegedly erroneous
admission of hearsay testimony, although criticized by the Court, did not
constitute reversible error.166 The Court's analysis strongly indicated, however,
that if the hearsay objection had been preserved, the chancellor's ruling would
153. Id.
154. Id.; see also In the Interest of D.K.L., 652 So. 2d 184 (Miss. 1995).
155. McDonald, 39 So. 3d at 883; see also In the Interest of R.D., 658 So. 2d 1378 (Miss. 1995).
156. McDonald, 39 So. 3d at 883; see also D.J.L. v. Bolivar Co. Dep't. of Human Servs., 824 So. 2d 617
(Miss. 2002).




161. Id. at 884.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing Whitehurst v. State, 540 So. 2d 1319 (Miss. 1989) (holding that "where a conflict exists
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have been overturned on appeal.167
B. Special Concurrence by Justice Dickinson
Justice Jess Dickinson, joined by four other Justices, wrote separately to
address Justice Pierce's contention that "guardians ad litem should be allowed to
introduce hearsay before chancellors to be used substantively at a trial on the
merits."1 68 According to Justice Dickinson, the Mississippi Rules of Evidence
apply to chancery court proceedings and include no exceptions for GALs. 169
Although GALs may appropriately rely on hearsay in formulating their opinions,
under Rules 702 and 706, the hearsay evidence may not be used substantively
unless it conforms with one of the several exceptions outlined in Rules 803 and
804.170 Justice Dickinson reasoned that the Rules of Evidence provide thirty-
one potential exceptions and that any non-conforming hearsay is, therefore,
blatantly unreliable.171  As such, chancellors should not make decisions
concerning the welfare of children based on "pure, rank, un-cross-examined
hearsay." 72 Finally, Justice Dickinson noted that Justice Pierce's concurring
opinion relied heavily on authority concerning youth court-and not chancery
court-proceedings.173
C. Concurrence by Justice Pierce
Justice Randy Pierce, concurring in part and in result, disagreed with the
majority's finding that the chancellor erred by accepting hearsay testimony from
the GAL.1 74 Justice Pierce, with whom Justices Waller and Graves agreed,
began by noting that the role of the GAL is complex and "not subject to a
simple, universal definition."1 75 In his view, settled precedent requires courts to
consider "all necessary and material information" in family court proceedings,
which occasionally may necessitate acceptance of hearsay testimony from the
GAL.1 76
In his analysis, Justice Pierce considered several of the same cases utilized
by the majority.177 But for his main contention-that hearsay testimony should
be admissible as substantive evidence when offered in a GAL's report-Justice
Pierce relied primarily on one case decided by the Massachusetts Court of
Appeals in 2006.178 In Pizzino v. Miller, the parents obtained a divorce and
167. Id.
168. Id. at 887.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 888.
172. Id. at 887.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 888 (Pierce, J., concurring).
175. Id. (citing S.G., 13 So. 3d at 269) (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 888.
177. Id. at 889.
178. Id.
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were awarded joint legal custody of the children.179 The mother later sought to
remove the children from Massachusetts, and the judge appointed a GAL to
represent the children's interests.180 At the hearing, the judge denied the
mother's request to move the children to South Carolina, stating that her new job
offered no "real advantage."181 The judge also relied on the opinion of the GAL
that the mother intended the move solely to deprive the father of a relationship
with the children.182 In its analysis, the court held that GAL reports may contain
hearsay information if the GAL is "available to testify at trial and [] the source of
the material [is] sufficiently identified so that the affected party has an
opportunity to rebut any adverse or erroneous material contained therein."1 83
Massachusetts, therefore, allows the substantive use of hearsay testimony
from GAL reports.184 To satisfy due process requirements there, the GAL must
be available for cross-examination.185 And the chancellor must be free to make
findings of fact and issue decisions independently of the GAL's
recommendations.186 Although no Mississippi case permits this exception,
Justice Pierce noted that "the majority, if not all, of the chancellors in
Mississippi follow this procedure-and are correct in doing so."187
Several other states have adopted rules similar to that articulated in Pizzino,
further indicating the acknowledged validity of Justice Pierce's proposed rule.
Chronologically, California was the first of eight other states to adopt such a
standard.188 In Fewel v. Fewel, for example, the court held that the affiant or
drafter of any report utilized in judicial proceedings must be subject to
examination by the adverse party.189 Pennsylvania followed suit, holding in
Commonwealth ex rel. Kuntz v. Stackhouse that "investigators themselves must
be produced and examined as witnesses and be subject to cross-examination, just
as all other witnesses."1 90 Illinois, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Utah, and Minnesota all align with this standard for admission.19 1
In addition to the Massachusetts authority, Justice Pierce noted several
practical concerns potentially stemming from Justice Dickinson's limited
analysis.192 First, chancellors are often forced to act quickly to preserve the best
179. Pizzino v. Miller, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 865, 867 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 868.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 876; see also Gilmore v. Gilmore, 369 Mass. 598, 603 (Mass. 1976).
184. Adoption of Sean, 36 Mass. 261, 263 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
185. Id. (citing Pizzino, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 875-76).
186. Id.
187. McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So. 3d 868, 889 (Miss. 2010).
188. Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 436 (Cal. 1943).
189. Id.
190. Commonwealth ex rel. Kuntz v. Stackhouse, 176 Pa. Super. 361, 368 (Penn. 1954).
191. State ex rel. Fisher v. Devins, 294 Minn. 496, 501 (Minn. 1972); Yearsley v. Yearsley, 94 Idaho
667, 669 (Idaho 1972); State in Interest of Pilling v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 414 (Utah 1970); Mazur v.
Lazarus, 196 A.2d 477, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1964); In re Rosmis, 26 Ill. App. 2d 226, 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960);
Daitoku v. Daitoku, 39 Haw. 276, 277 (Hawaii 1952).
192. McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So. 3d 868, 889 (Miss. 2010).
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interests of the child and must do so with the assistance of a GAL.1 93 Under
these circumstances, the GAL would be unable to enlist witnesses and must
"provide emergency testimony which contains hearsay." 94  Second, strict
adherence to the Rules of Evidence could exclude potentially critical
testimony;195 although common in other judicial proceedings, such an exclusion
in chancery court could impact the well being of vulnerable children. Third,
chancellors are familiar with the task of weighing evidence and are capable of
assigning the appropriate weight to hearsay and nonhearsay testimony.196
Finally, the GAL's role as a best-interests attorney, or as an arm of the court,
requires that the GAL enjoy substantial leeway to "testify as to the full extent of
their findings." 97 Justice Pierce concluded by relying on his experience as a
chancellor, stating that "[t]here can be no cookie-cutter approach to protecting
children."198
Attempting to counter Justice Pierce's use of Pizzino, the majority noted
one case, Scaringe v. Herrick, which (rather weakly) rebutted the Massachusetts
standard upon which the McDonald concurrence principally relied.199  In
Scaringe, a Florida court reviewed a modification motion and noted that the
GAL's report contained hearsay information.200 The court reasoned that the
Florida Rules of Evidence applied to GAL reports and that if a hearsay objection
is raised at trial it should be sustained.20 1 But the petitioner in Scaringe did not
object to the admission of the testimony, and the court concluded that its
admission was "not so fundamentally unfair as to warrant a remand for a new
hearing."202 The Scaringe court, therefore, affirmed the decision of the chancery
court, noting that a chancellor may consider certain evidence in "child custody
matters without regard to the rules of evidence."203 The court ruled that the sole
prerequisite is that the proponent of the evidence be appropriately qualified so as
to ensure the reliability of the evidence sought to be admitted.204
V. ANALYSIS
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 802 provides that hearsay evidence is not
admissible unless otherwise provided by law.205  The Mississippi version
directly tracks the language of Federal Rule 802,206 which proceeds to list





198. Id. at 889-90.
199. Id. at 885, fn. 8.





205. Miss. R. EVID. 802.
206. Miss. R. EVID. 802: "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law." FED. R. EVID. 802:
"Hearsay is not admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise: a federal statute, these rules, or
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situations in which hearsay might not be precluded from consideration.207 For
example, hearsay is appropriately admitted in federal courts when expressly
permitted by statute, rule, or Supreme Court decision.208 These exceptions
indicate that the Mississippi Supreme Court could allow hearsay testimony from
a GAL's report in chancery court if it were so inclined.
The following section will examine several reasons why testimonial hearsay
was appropriately admitted by the Rankin County Chancery Court in McDonald
and why such testimony should be admitted in similar chancery court
proceedings. In his special concurrence, Justice Dickinson erroneously reasoned
that the distinction between youth and chancery court rules precluded the
application of Justice Pierce's proffered authority.209 But youth and chancery
court serve a similar function, so the rules should, therefore, be applied similarly.
Further, the role of the chancellor as sole factfinder serves as a safeguard against
the abuses the rule against hearsay was designed to prevent. Finally, GALs
serve the important public function of protecting the interests of children, which
would be impossible without significant leeway with regard to testimonial and
investigative capacity.
A. The Lenient Evidentiary Rules Applied in Youth Court Should be Applied in
Chancery Court Because the Two Courts Serve Similar Purposes.
The majority, curtly and without reasoning, stated that the chancellor erred
by "find[ing] that the rules of evidence did not apply in this adversarial
proceeding" and, consequently, held that the use of hearsay testimony from the
GAL's report was inappropriate.210 The lack of analysis in the majority opinion
stems from the moomess of the issue: Jennifer's acquiescence to the
modification motion nullified the problem.211 The Court's inability-or
unwillingness-to address the substantive question effectively relegated the
matter to the concurrences.212  Although Justice Dickinson, in his special
concurrence, relied primarily on evidentiary rules, he contended that Justice
Pierce's reliance on Pizzino was misplaced because Pizzino involved youth court
proceedings and McDonald involved chancery court proceedings.213 But the
distinction is immaterial because youth and chancery courts are essentially two
sides of the same coin.
Justice Pierce's proposed rule would allow GALs to offer hearsay
testimony to be used substantively at a trial on the merits.2 14 Such a proposal
would undoubtedly find success in youth court, where the Rules of Evidence do
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court."
207. FED. R. EVID. 802.
208. Id.
209. McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So. 3d 868, 887 (Miss. 2010).
210. Id. at 884.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 887-89.
213. Id. at 887.
214. Id. at 890.
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not apply and other evidentiary standards are more lenient.2 15 In T.L.C., the
Court noted that the main evidentiary requirement in youth court is constitutional
compliance alone.2 16 The statute governing the operation of the youth court
system illustrates the difference between youth court and other judicial
proceedings; not only do evidentiary standards differ, but matters involving
related parties may be severed at the discretion of the chancellor.2 17 The
question remains whether the lenient standards permitted in youth court should
also be observed in chancery court proceedings with regard to cases of the same
subject matter.
The relaxed evidentiary rules applied in youth court should also be applied
in chancery court for several reasons. First, youth courts were specifically
developed as a division of chancery court to execute chancery functions "in
counties which do not have [chancery] courts."2 18 Chancellors preside over
youth court proceedings, which concern only cases of abuse and neglect.2 19
Thus, the youth court acts as an arm of the chancery court by exercising
exclusive jurisdiction over the most vulnerable participants in domestic
disputes.2 20 Although chancery court exercises primary jurisdiction in most
custody cases, chancery and youth courts often exercise concurrent jurisdiction,
especially in cases of abuse.22 1 Chancellors should adopt the same evidentiary
standards for use in both settings because youth courts were established to fulfill
chancery functions in certain counties. The language of the enabling act
indicates that the two courts are related in both function and form,222 So logic
dictates that the same rules should govern both youth and chancery court
proceedings. As of the time McDonald was decided, hearsay within a GAL's
report would likely be admissible in youth court but not chancery court; such a
divergent standard is inappropriate considering the courts' similarities of
function.
Second, neither the youth court nor the chancery court controls the other;
the two essentially work in tandem to ensure that the best interests of the child
are recognized.223 Although chancery court was established first, the two courts
are not often distinguished as being "superior" and "inferior." Admittedly, the
youth court was created by the legislature based on a constitutional provision
215. In Interest of T.L.C., 566 So. 2d 691, 700 (Miss. 1990).
216. Id. (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-203).
217. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-203 ("(2) All cases involving children shall be heard at any place the
judge deems suitable but separately from the trial of cases involving adults. (3) Hearings in all cases involving
children shall be conducted without a jury and may be recessed from time to time. (4) All hearings shall be
conducted under such rules of evidence and rules of court as may comply with applicable constitutional
standards . . . .").
218. In the Interest of D.L.D., 606 So. 2d 1125, 1127 (Miss. 1992) (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-
107(3)).
219. Id. at 1127-28.
220. See id.
221. Helmert v. Biffany, 842 So. 2d 1287, 1292 (Miss. 2003) (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-151(1)(c)
(Supp. 1999)).
222. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-107 (1972).
223. In Interest of T.L.C., 566 So. 2d 691, 696-97 (Miss. 1990).
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allowing for the creation of "inferior courts."224 But the provision is not
construed to mean that youth court is subservient to chancery court; youth courts
are merely a legislatively-created "exception where abused children are
concerned."22 5 When faced with similar questions, other states have held that
the jurisdiction of the youth (or juvenile) court may even be recognized above
chancery court judgments if the best-interests analysis mandates such a result.226
Even Mississippi "has allowed the youth court to issue orders in contradiction of
those issued by chancery court" under some circumstances.227 Such flexibility,
coupled with the absence of a judicial hierarchy, permits a measure of latitude
concerning the admission of evidence and other procedural standards. Because
neither court is superior, any potential concerns regarding the supremacy of one
evidentiary standard (as opposed to the standard used in the other court system)
are moot. The Court should not allow this distinction to control its adoption of
new law because neither the chancery court hearsay rules nor the youth court
standards must take precedence.
Third, youth and chancery courts hear cases involving the same subject
matter.2 28 Chancery court has jurisdiction over domestic proceedings, including
custody disputes and cases involving abused or neglected children.229 Although
youth courts cannot hear paternity matters, it can, like chancery court, adjudicate
most cases concerning domestic matters involving children.23 0 Consistency in
the law mandates similar treatment of comparable issues. The different
standards utilized in youth and chancery court have the potential to create an
unpredictability that would render the entire judicial process ineffective. For
example, the hearsay rule articulated in McDonald would likely have been
decided differently had the Madison County Youth Court retained jurisdiction.
Such inconsistency weakens the force of the law and portrays the judicial system
as being fickle and erratic. In order to prevent such undesirable results, the
Court should articulate one standard for both youth and chancery court
proceedings-the lenient standard more conducive to domestic proceedings
generally.
Finally, youth and chancery courts use veral of the same procedural rules
regarding GALs,23 1 indicating that similar evidentiary standards should also be
observed. For example, the youth and chancery courts are both permitted to
entirely disregard a GAL's recommendation if the weight of the evidence
224. D.L.D., 606 So. 2d at 1127 (citing MISS. CONST. art. 6, § 172 (1890)).
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., In re Anne P., 199 Cal. App. 3d 183 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a juvenile
court may assume jurisdiction over proceedings involving a minor who had been molested by her father even
after the superior court had awarded the father custody in the earlier divorce proceedings).
227. Helmert v. Biffany, 842 So. 2d 1287, 1292 (Miss. 2003) (citing D.L.D., 606 So. 2d at 1127 (Miss.
1992) (holding "youth court had exclusive original jurisdiction to determine custody and visitation rights with
respect to [an] abused child, even though its order was in direct conflict with that of chancery court in parents'
divorce proceedings which were initiated prior to youth court proceedings")).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1291-92.
230. Id. at 1291.
231. In re L.D.M., 848 So. 2d 181, 182 (Miss. 2003).
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indicates its impropriety.2 32 The comparable procedures in youth and chancery
court indicate that the lenient evidentiary rules observed in youth court would be
appropriate in chancery court also. The Court should allow its admission in
chancery proceedings to preserve continuity because hearsay testimony would
likely be admissible in youth court.
B. The Role of the Chancellor Renders the Use ofHearsay Testimony More
Permissible in Chancery Court Than it Would be in Other Judicial Settings.
By limiting the authority to consider pertinent evidence, the McDonald
Court effectively undermined the chancellor's ability to protect the best interests
of the children involved in various domestic matters. In chancery and youth
court proceedings, procedural standards and evidentiary admissions and the
ultimate disposition of the case, are "determined by the sound discretion of the
chancellor."233  In this context, the chancellor (and not a jury) acts as the
factfinder, and the chancellor alone is tasked with considering the evidence,
recommendations, and other pertinent information necessary for the disposition
of the case.2 34 The chancellor should be permitted to consider hearsay testimony
in a GAL's report because the chancellor has a substantial discretion to
determine which evidence is appropriate for review and the experience necessary
to determine what evidence should be dispositive of a particular issue.
In his concurrence, Justice Pierce relies on his own experience as a
chancellor to advocate this position.235 Although reliance on the Rules of
Evidence is generally appropriate, delicate chancery matters require a less
formulaic approach.2 36 If a jury was tasked with making chancery court
decisions, stringent application of the Rules of Evidence may be appropriate.
But the chancellor is an impartial arbitrator capable of properly exercising sole
discretion.2 37 The dissent in D.K.L. properly observed that the chancellor is "in
a much better position to gauge the depth of [a] witness' knowledge and
conviction."2 38
Considering first the broad grant of discretion, myopic restrictions like the
one set out in McDonald act as both a hindrance to the judicial process and as an
insult to the chancellor's legal duties. If the judicial system trusts chancellors to
appoint GALs when necessary and to properly issue "opinion[s] and
232. Id.
233. In the Interest of R.D., 658 So. 2d 1378, 1384 (Miss. 1995).
234. Lorenz v. Strait, 987 So. 2d 427, 431 (Miss. 2008) (citing S.N.C. v. J.R.D., 755 So. 2d 1077, 1082
(Miss. 2000)).
235. McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So. 3d 868, 890 (Miss. 2010) (Pierce, J., concurring).
236. Id.
237. The danger associated with permitting hearsay testimony in other judicial proceedings involves the
jury's inability to test the declarant's testimonial capacities (perception, memory, narration, and sincerity) by
demeanor evidence and cross-examination. FIsHER ON EVIDENCE, 377-79 (2013). But similar concerns are not
present in chancery court proceedings for several reasons. First, the chancellor's experience would render him
or her more capable of scrutinizing the testimony. And the GAL, as a best-interests advocate, is trained to
present correct testimony, which is necessary to the proper determination of the issues involving child welfare.
238. In the Interest of D.K.L., 652 So. 2d 184, 194 (Miss. 1995) (Lee, J., dissenting).
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judgment[s],"239 it should not arbitrarily restrict the information the chancellor
can consider in order to make those decisions. Considering the gravity
associated with issuing a final judgment, the chancellor should be trusted also to
consider all pertinent evidence without allowing that evidence to overweigh his
or her ability to judge the circumstances of a particular case fairly.
In addition to the broad grant of discretion, chancellors possess the training
and experience necessary to weigh hearsay and nonhearsay testimony
appropriately. According to Section 43-21-601 of the Mississippi Code, both
hearsay and opinion evidence may be admitted in dispositional hearings240 in
youth court, over which chancellors preside.241 Just as chancellors in youth
court are able to differentiate and weigh hearsay and nonhearsay evidence
properly, the same chancellors should be afforded similar latitude in chancery
court proceedings. In Jones v. Jones, the dissent criticized the majority for
assessing a chancellor's actions too critically, noting that chancellors are
"experienced, knowledgeable, and [] dependable jurist[s]" who often use that
experience to reach an equitable result in emotionally-charged situations.242
Therefore, the broad grant of discretion provided chancellors generally is
compatible with the chancellors' experience in handling domestic disputes. Not
allowing the chancellor to use that discretion and experience in assessing critical
testimony is far too restrictive.
Last, hearsay testimony should be admissible as a part of a GAL's oral or
written report in chancery court because the chancellor is not bound to accept the
evidence as truth and may disregard it when issuing the final order. Although
the chancellor may adopt a GAL's report in its entirety,2 43 the chancellor is also
free to completely ignore the GAL's findings and need only report his or her
reasons for doing so.2 44 So permitting hearsay testimony in a GAL's report is
not unduly prejudicial, as indicated by the majority in McDonald.2 45 Rather, the
admission of hearsay testimony in chancery court simply provides the chancellor
a more comprehensive picture of the circumstances surrounding a particular
matter. The learned chancellor may then disregard the evidence if it is found to
lack adequate indicia of reliability. Considering the chancellor's unique ability
to sift the evidence as a result of his or her substantial legal training, the
admission of contested hearsay evidence only contributes to (as opposed to
potentially detracting from) the proceedings.
At least one of the practical concerns Justice Pierce flagged in his
concurrence concerning the chancellor's discretion was implicated in McDonald.
239. S.G. v. D.C., 13 So. 3d 269, 276 (Miss. 2009).
240. A dispositional hearing is held "to determine the appropriate disposition" for a child previously
adjudicated delinquent. Rule 4 Comments & Procedures, Uniform Rules of Youth Court Practice, MISSISSIPPI
RULES OF COURT, https:/courts.ms.gov/rules/msrulesofcourt/uniform rules ycpractice.pdf (last visited Feb.
16, 2016).
241. D.J.L. v. Bolivar Co. Dep't. of Human Servs., 824 So. 2d 617, 621 (Miss. 2002) (citing MISS. CODE
ANN. § 43-21-601 (2000)).
242. Jones v. Jones, 43 So. 3d 465, 495 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
243. Pogue v. Pogue, 126 So. 3d 967, 970 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
244. In re L.D.M., 848 So. 2d 181, 182 (Miss. 2003).
245. McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So. 3d 868, 884 (Miss. 2010).
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The Rankin County chancellor acknowledged that the teacher's statements and
the statements of the children were hearsay evidence and admitted them
anyway.2 46 This admission in McDonald adds credence to Justice Pierce's
contention that chancellors in Mississippi observe his proposed rule already.247
Fundamentally, chancery court does not involve fact-finding by a jury of twelve
but by one experienced chancellor. More lenient evidentiary standards should
be permissible because the procedures are different in chancery court.
C. Public Policy Requires the Substantive Use of Testimonial Hearsay from GAL
Reports.
Considering the function of chancery court and the role of the chancellor,
the Mississippi Supreme Court should adopt the rule articulated by Justice Pierce
in his concurrence. Perhaps the Court's hesitance to depart from traditional
hearsay rules stems from a strict adherence to evidentiary procedure.2 48 But
several policy considerations indicate that such devotion to the Rules of
Evidence is not appropriate in chancery court, especially considering the unique
role of the GAL.
1. GALs are often required to provide emergency testimony and may be
unable to procure witnesses in a timely manner.
As a part of his concurrence, Justice Pierce notes one of his primary
grievances with the majority's narrow-minded application of the rule against
hearsay: "[G]uardians ad litem are required to act swiftly to protect the best
interests of children-and to fulfill that obligation, they must sometimes provide
emergency testimony which contains hearsay."24 9  The circumstances in
McDonald exemplify this concern. Jennifer and Steven filed several
modification motions, and the evidence prompted the chancellor to conduct
emergency hearings to determine the best custody arrangement for the
children.2 50  When the GAL moved to suspend Jennifer's Wednesday night
visitation, for example, the GAL was required to present an oral report at the
emergency hearing.2 51 The record is devoid of any indication that the GAL
could not procure witnesses in a timely manner, but the role of the GAL as a
best-interests attorney indicates that she presented the most reliable evidence
available to her at the time of the hearing.25 2
Limiting the ability of the GAL to present hearsay testimony for substantive
use would significantly inhibit his or her ability to provide effective emergency
testimony. Under the current McDonald framework, a GAL would be unable to
present her comprehensive findings at an emergency custody hearing unless she
246. Id.
247. See id. at 889 (Pierce, J., concurring).
248. See id. at 887 (Dickenson, J., specially concurring).
249. Id. at 889 (Pierce, J., concurring).
250. Id. at 875-76.
251. Id. at 876-77.
252. See id. at 883.
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was able to secure several witnesses to appear in court to testify on as few as
perhaps twenty-four hours' notice. Such a scheme gives rise to insurmountable
practical concerns. Chancery court proceedings concern time-sensitive matters
involving the most vulnerable members of society. Any inhibition on the free
flow of information in this setting is inappropriate and potentially harmful to
those not equipped to protect themselves.
2. GALs may become frustrated if significant portions of their investigations
are omitted from consideration.
Further, disallowing the consideration of a GAL's investigative report could
foster a sense of disillusionment among advocates generally.253 In her April
2003 article concerning GALs in the State of Florida, Michelle Johnson-Weider
addressed the very case that the McDonald majority used to rebut Justice
Pierce's proposed rule.254 The Scaringe court held that hearsay objections to
testimony within a GAL report should be sustained, but application of the rule
often leaves something to be desired:
It can be shocking or unnerving for a guardian to discover for
the first time in court hat his or her testimony can be blocked by
hearsay objections or that the GAL's report serves more as a
convenient reference for the parties' attorneys than as evidence
for the judge to consider.255
Fundamentally, the exclusion of valuable hearsay testimony indicates a lack
of trust in the GAL's abilities to differentiate between reliable and unreliable
testimony.
The GAL's potential sources of frustration as a result of the McDonald rule
are firmly grounded in reality. First, requiring the chancellor to question the
same witnesses that the GAL has already questioned would render the GAL's
work "duplicative at best."256 And prohibiting a GAL from testifying would
compromise his or her ability to truly represent the children's best interests.257
GALs are important players in chancery court, and the importance of their roles
as advocates and protectors should not be diminished by a procedural rule that
effectively nullifies a great majority of their investigative and reporting power.
Some standards are certainly necessary for the proper regulation of evidence, but
shortsighted restrictions like the one in McDonald have the potential to
dishearten those whose passionate advocacy is essential to the proper function of
the chancery court system.
253. See Johnson-Weider, supra note 9, ¶ 14.
254. Id. at¶14-15.
255. Id. at¶ 14.
256. Id. at 17.
257. See id.
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3. Hearsay evidence offered by a GAL in chancery court bears greater indicia
of reliability than hearsay offered in other judicial proceedings.
Finally, an obvious concern presumed to be allayed by the application of
hearsay rules involves the reliability of the testimony in question. But the
dissent in D.K.L. aptly dismissed the reliability concern in one fell swoop. 258
Although considering the testimony of a therapist (and not that of a GAL), the
dissent reasoned that hearsay testimony was admissible if previously-admitted
evidence tended to corroborate the validity of the information in question.259 In
McDonald, the hearsay information should have been admitted because prior
exhibits-including attendance and discipline reports-would likely tend
corroborate the testimony offered at the emergency hearing (or, at least, increase
the likelihood of its reliability). 260 The chancellor had received evidence of the
boys' misbehavior on several previous occasions, so the GAL's report could be
said to bear sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.
Further, the GAL's role as an investigative arm of the court and not an
affiliate of either party alleviates some of the dangers posed by hearsay evidence
in other court settings.261 For example, a GAL's training lessens the likelihood
of "faulty perception and narration."2 62 And a GAL is unlikely to lie to the
court,263 considering the chancellor's broad discretion to admit additional
corroborating or contradictory evidence. Last, the likelihood of faulty memory
is negligible because a GAL records his or her findings throughout the course of
the investigation and must simply report those findings to the court during the
hearing.2 64  Fundamentally, the testimony of a GAL is logically more
trustworthy than the testimony offered by an ordinary witness, who may be
obligated to one party or whose memory or narrative abilities may be
compromised. Thus, the Court should revise its stance on this issue; the nature
of chancery court proceedings and the role of the GAL clearly and
unambiguously warrant the substantive use of hearsay testimony.
VI. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
In his concurrence, Justice Pierce outlined a workable solution: "I
recommend we adopt a rule specifically for guardians ad litem with guidance
from chancellors, practitioners, guardians ad litem and other interested parties.
The best interests of the children demand it."265 In 2014, the Mississippi
legislature acted on his advice and proposed a bill that would have permitted the
258. In the Interest of D.K.L., 652 So. 2d 184, 193 (Miss. 1995).
259. Id.
260. McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So. 3d 868, 872 (Miss. 2010).
261. See Johnson-Weider, supra note 9, ¶ 13-15.
262. Id. at ¶ 13-14 ("GALs receive special training to conduct their statutorily mandated investigations
and prepare their reports, and are available in court to testify to their investigative techniques"). Overall, the
nature of the GAL's role renders the investigative and reporting capacity more transparent han the testimonial
role of ordinary witnesses.
263. Id. at ¶ 13.
264. Id.
265. McDonald, 39 So. 3d at 890 (Pierce, J., concurring).
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substantive use of hearsay testimony in chancery court proceedings.266 The text
of the proposal directly implicates the policy concerns outlined above:
The guardian ad litem acts as an arm of the court and is an
integral part of the judicial process. Guardian ad litem reports
may properly contain hearsay information. A guardian ad litem
must fulfill their duty to interview all concerned and they must
also be able to testify as to the full extent of their findings. All
that is required is that the guardian ad litem be available to
testify at trial and that the source of the material be sufficiently
identified so that the affected party has an opportunity to rebut
any adverse or erroneous material contained therein. The
guardian ad litem is free to make recommendations, provided
the judge draws his own conclusions and understands that the
responsibility of deciding the case is his and not that of the
guardian.267
The 2014 proposal died without debate, but earlier versions of the bill
enjoyed limited success.268 In 2011 and 2012, the bills (styled House Bill 689
and House Bill 949, respectively) passed the House but died in the Senate.269
Unfortunately, legislative history detailing the cause of the failure is limited, but
the presentation of House Bill 949 was recorded and catalogued.27 0 During his
presentation, the bill's sponsor (a representative from Holmes County) detailed
the provisions within the bill, which was designed to permit the use of hearsay
testimony in GAL reports.271 The Speaker entertained several questions, and
one representative asked the bill's sponsor to explain the policy rationale behind
permitting hearsay testimony in the chancery court context.272 According to the
sponsor, hearsay is appropriate in GAL reports because the chancellor is often
unable to personally conduct a full investigation and must rely on the GAL-
acting in the best interests of the child-to provide complete and unbiased
testimony.273
During the debate, two concerns emerged regarding the prudence of
permitting hearsay testimony in GAL reports.2 74 First, some representatives
were troubled by the use of rank hearsay without a proper opportunity for cross-
examination.2 75 But the bill adequately addressed the confrontation issue.276 If
266. H.B. 1058, 2014 Sess. (Miss. 2014), as quoted in DAVID L. CALDER, UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI
CHILD ADVOCACY CLINIC, UPDATE ON RECENT CASE LAW AND GAL RESOURCES 8 (2013).
267. Id.
268. See H.B. 949, Legislative History Project, MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE SCHOOL OF LAW,
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the GAL intended to present hearsay testimony, he or she must notify each party
in advance so that the parties had an opportunity to conduct independent
investigations.27 7 And this provision generated a second concern: GAL reports
are often prepared late in the proceedings, and some attorneys are not provided a
copy until the morning of the hearing.2 78 But the sponsor ultimately dismissed
that concern, noting that the chancellor has the authority to compel a more timely
submission of GAL reports.279 Despite those reservations, the bill passed the
House almost unanimously-with 116 in favor and 2 in opposition.2 80
But House Bill 949 died in the Senate28 1 for presumably the same reasons
that two representatives disfavored the bill in the House. Addressing the
concerns raised during the House debate could increase the proposal's likelihood
of success. First, legislators should be certain that permitting hearsay testimony
would not compromise a party's ability to obtain a fair and impartial hearing.
But the GAL's role as an advocate for the child-and not the parties-
significantly lessens the likelihood that he or she would be biased in favor of one
or the other. Because the chancellor may not be able to investigate the matter
personally, the GAL is the most impartial source of information in the chancery
court context. Second, several mechanisms could be enacted to lessen the
probability of procedural unfairness. The chancellor could require (when
possible) the submission of GAL reports well before the scheduled hearings to
allow adequate time for independent investigations. Or the chancellor could
suspend proceedings (when possible) if he or she feels that one party merits
additional time to examine the declarants quoted by the GAL.
Amending the GAL statute would ameliorate the hearsay concern raised in
McDonald. To avoid separation of powers concerns, however, the legislature
should amend the Rules of Evidence instead. For example, Rule 803 (governing
hearsay exceptions regardless of whether the declarant is available)2 82 could be
revised to provide a twenty-sixth exception-permitting hearsay testimony in
GAL reports in chancery court. The suggested language is as follows (stylized
appropriately):
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though
the declarant is available as a witness:2 83 (26) Guardians ad
Litem. A statement contained within the report(s) of a guardian
ad litem (GAL) in chancery court provided that (a) the GAL is
appointed as a best-interests advocate to ensure the proper






281. H.B. 949, Bill Status, MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE, http://billstatus.1s.state.ms.us/2012/pdf/history/HB/
HB0949.xml (last visited Feb. 16, 2016).
282. Miss. R. EVID. 803.
283. MIss. R. EVID. 803.
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wishes of the adult parties; (b) the GAL's report is submitted to
the chancellor and all parties within one week of the hearing
(excluding emergency hearings) at which it will be used; and (c)
the GAL makes him- or herself available for cross-examination
at the hearing during which the report is used.
Fundamentally, the use of hearsay testimony in GAL reports is too needed
to disallow based on procedural technicalities alone. No reason exists to further
delay the codification of Justice Pierce's proposed rule because both of the
legislature's articulated concerns may be resolved by adequate concessions.
VII. CONCLUSION
With the McDonald decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court compromised
a GAL's ability to fulfill the prescribed statutory function-"to protect the
interest of the child." 284 The Court's strict reliance on the Rules of Evidence285
compromises a chancellor's ability to conduct business as usual, i.e., admitting
the testimony necessary for a fair determination of child custody, termination of
parental rights, etc.286 Instead of embracing Justice Pierce's proposal, the Court
articulated a rule with minimal analysis and strained the purpose and function of
chancery procedure to conform with procedures observed in distinguishable
judicial settings.287 Permitting the substantive use of testimonial hearsay in a
GAL's report is more conducive to the emotionally-charged nature of chancery
proceedings, and such use conforms with the chancellor's ability to render
impartial decisions without the assistance of a jury. The Court's decision in
McDonald indicates instead that a GAL's testimony is valued no higher than that
of an ordinary witness. As such, the rule proposed by Justice Pierce (and further
explained in this Note) should be adopted as governing law.
284. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23.
285. McDonald v. McDonald, 39 So. 3d 868, 887 (Miss. 2010).
286. Id. at 889 (Pierce, J., concurring).
287. Id. at 884.
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